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Introduction
The concept of egalitarianism, mainly based on Lorenz domination, has generated several core-related solution concepts on the set of cooperative crisp games with transferable utility (cooperative TU-games): the constrained egalitarian solution (Dutta and Ray (1989) ), the Lorenz solution (Hougaard et al. (2001) ), the Lorenz stable set and the egalitarian core (Arin and Inarra (2001) ). The class of convex crisp games is the only standard class of cooperative TU-games for which the constrained egalitarian solution exists and, moreover, it belongs to the core and Lorenz dominates every other core allocation. It turns out that all the other egalitarian solutions mentioned above coincide for convex crisp games with the constrained egalitarian solution.
On this class of cooperative TU-games alternative axiomatic characterizations of the constrained egalitarian solution are provided by Dutta (1990) , Hokari (2000) , Klijn et al. (2000) . This solution for a convex crisp game can be obtained using the algorithm proposed by Dutta and Ray (1989) or the formula suggested by Hokari (2000) .
Another solution concept related to the norm of equity is the equal division core proposed by Selten (1972) . He introduces it in order to explain outcomes in experimental cooperative games and notes that in 76 % of 207 experimental games the outcomes have a "strong tendency to be in the equal division core". Axiomatic characterizations of this solution concept on two classes of cooperative TU-games are provided by Bhattacharya (2002) .
The main purpose of this paper is to introduce on one hand the egalitarian solution in the context of convex fuzzy games as proposed by Branzei et al. (2002a) , and on the other hand the equal division core for arbitrary fuzzy games.
Cooperative fuzzy games have proved to be suitable for modelling cooperative behavior of agents in economic situations (Billot (1995) , Nishizaki and Sakawa (2001) ) and political situations (Butnariu (1978) , Lebret and Ziad (2001) ) in which some agents do not fully participate in a coalition but only to a certain extent. For example in a class of production games, partial participation in a coalition means to offer a part of the resources while full participation means to offer all the resources. A coalition including players who participate partially can be treated in the context of cooperative game theory as a so-called fuzzy coalition, introduced by Aubin (1974 Aubin ( , 1981 .
The theory of cooperative fuzzy games started with the cited work of Aubin where the notions of a fuzzy game and the core of a fuzzy game are introduced. In the meantime many solution concepts have been developed The outline of the paper is as follows. Sections 2 and 3 provide the nec-essary notions and facts for cooperative crisp and fuzzy games, respectively. Section 4 introduces an egalitarian solution for convex fuzzy games by adjusting the classical Dutta-Ray algorithm for convex crisp games. Three examples illustrate that requiring only supermodularity of a fuzzy game does not assure the existence of such an egalitarian solution. It is proved that adding coordinate-wise convexity to supermodularity guarantees the existence of a maximal fuzzy coalition corresponding to a crisp coalition, at each step of the adjusted Dutta-Ray algorithm. It turns out that the introduced egalitarian solution lies in the core of the convex fuzzy game and coincides with the Dutta-Ray egalitarian solution of the corresponding crisp game. In Section 5 the equal division core of an arbitrary fuzzy game is introduced and it is shown that for any convex fuzzy game the egalitarian solution is an allocation in the equal division core of the game, and the equal division core of a convex fuzzy game coincides with the equal division core of the corresponding crisp game. Section 6 concludes with some final remarks.
Cooperative crisp games
A cooperative crisp game hN, wi consists of a finite set of players N, N = {1, 2, . . . , n} and a map w : 2 N → < with w(∅) = 0. For S ∈ 2 N , w(S) is called the worth of coalition S and it is interpreted as the amount of money (utility) the coalition can obtain, when the players in S work together. The class of crisp games with player set N is denoted by G N .
The core of a game hN, wi ∈ G N is the convex set
consisting of efficient vectors with sum of the coordinates equal to w(N) and with the property that no coalition S can obtain more than P i∈S x i in splitting off.
An interesting element of the core of a convex crisp game hN, wi is the Dutta-Ray egalitarian allocation E (N, w) which can be described in a simple way and found easily in a finite number of steps. Let |S| be the number of players in the coalition S, S ∈ 2 N . For any coalition S, we denote its average worth with respect to the characteristic function w by a (S, w) := w(S) |S| . In Step 1 of the Dutta-Ray algorithm one considers the game hN 1 , w 1 i with N 1 := N, w 1 := w, and the per capita value a (T, w 1 ) for each nonempty subcoalition T of N 1 . Then the largest element T 1 ∈ 2 N 1 \ {∅} in arg max T ∈2 N 1 \{∅} a (T, w 1 ) is taken and E i (N, w) = a (T 1 , w 1 ) for all i ∈ T 1 is defined. For a convex crisp game hN 1 , w 1 i it is well known that the finite set arg max S∈2 N 1 \{∅} a (S, w 1 ) is closed w.r.t. the union operation, that is if
This implies that arg max S∈2 N 1 \{∅} a (S, w 1 ) has a largest element w.r.t. the partial order of inclusion on sets, namely ∪ © T | T ∈ arg max S∈2 N 1 \{∅} a (S, w 1 ) ª .
If T 1 = N, then we stop.
In case T 1 6 = N, then in Step 2 of the algorithm one considers the convex
otherwise we continue by considering the game hN 3 ,
After a finite number of steps the algorithm stops, and the obtained allocation E (N, w) is called the constrained egalitarian solution of the game hN, wi.
Since the constrained egalitarian solution is in the core of the corresponding convex game, it is interesting to study the interrelation between E(N, w)
and every other core allocation in terms of a special kind of domination which can be introduced as follows.
Consider a society of n individuals with aggregate income fixed at I units.
For
x n ) the vector obtained by rearranging its coordinates in a non-decreasing order, that is, b
with at least one strict inequality.
As mentioned in the Introduction, Dutta and Ray (1989) prove that for convex crisp games the constrained egalitarian solution Lorenz dominates every other core allocation.
Another core-like solution concept which is related to the norm of equity is the equal division core introduced by Selten (1972) . Given a cooperative crisp game hN, wi, the equal division core EDC(N, w) is the set (
, consisting of efficient pay-off vectors for the grand coalition which can not be blocked by the equal division allocation of any subcoalition. It is clear that the core of a cooperative crisp game is included in the equal division core of that game.
Cooperative fuzzy games
Given the set N = {1, 2, . . . , n} of players, a fuzzy coalition is a vector s ∈ [0, 1] N . The i-th coordinate s i of s is called the participation level of player i in the fuzzy coalition s. Instead of [0, 1] N we will also write F N for the set of fuzzy coalitions. A crisp coalition S ∈ 2 N corresponds in a canonical way to the fuzzy coalition e S , where e S ∈ F N is the vector with
The fuzzy coalition e S corresponds to the situation where the players in S fully cooperate (i.e. with participation level 1) and the players outside S are not involved at all (i.e. they have participation level 0). We denote by e i the fuzzy coalition corresponding to the crisp coalition S = {i}. The fuzzy coalition e N is called the grand coalition, and the fuzzy coalition (the n−dimensional vector) (0, 0, . . . , 0) corresponds to the empty crisp coalition. We denote by F N 0 the set of nonempty fuzzy coalitions.
A fuzzy game hN, vi consists of the player set N and a map v : F N → < with the property v(0) = 0. The map v assigns to each fuzzy coalition a number, telling what such a coalition can achieve in cooperation. In the following the set of fuzzy games with player set N will be denoted by F G N and in the next sections we will consider the crisp operator cr :
For a fuzzy game hN, vi ∈ F G N , the corresponding crisp game hN,
The core of a fuzzy game hN, vi (Aubin, 1974) is defined by
So, x ∈ C(N, v) can be seen as a distribution of the value of the grand coalition e N , where for each fuzzy coalition s, the total payoff is not smaller
A special class of fuzzy games with a non-empty core is the class of convex
The IAMR property is equivalent to the following pair of properties (cf. 
where s ∨ t and s ∧ t are those elements of [0, 1] N with the i−th coordinate equal to max {s i , t i } and min {s i , t i }, respectively;
(ii) Coordinate-wise convexity (CwC):
Hereafter we will denote the class of convex fuzzy games with player set N by CF G N .
An egalitarian solution for convex fuzzy games
We will introduce here an egalitarian solution for a convex fuzzy game by adjusting the classical Dutta-Ray algorithm for a convex crisp game.
As mentioned in Section 2, at each step of the Dutta-Ray algorithm for convex crisp games a largest element exists. Note that for the crisp case supermodularity of the characteristic function is equivalent to convexity of the corresponding game.
However, when a cooperative fuzzy game is convex, convexity of the game is equivalent to supermodularity and coordinate-wise convexity of the charac- Note that α (s, v) can be viewed as a per participation-level-unit value of coalition s.
Lemma 1 Let hN, vi ∈ F G N be a supermodular game. Then the set
) is closed w.r.t. the join operation ∨.
the join operation.
Suppose now α ∈ <. Take t 1 , t 2 ∈ A (N, v). We have to prove that
Since v (t 1 ) = α dt 1 c and v (t 2 ) = α dt 2 c we obtain
where the first inequality follows from the (SM) property and the second inequality follows from the definition of α and the fact that v(0) = 0. This
We can conclude from the proof that in case t 1 , t 2 ∈ A(N, v) not only
is closed w.r.t. finite "unions", where t 1 ∨ t 2 is seen as the "union" of t 1 and t 2 .
If we try to introduce in a way similar to that of Dutta and Ray (1989) an egalitarian rule for supermodular fuzzy games, then problems may arise since the set of fuzzy coalitions is infinite and it is not clear if there exists a maximal fuzzy coalition with "maximum value per unit of participation level". To be more precise, if hN, vi is a supermodular fuzzy game then crucial questions are:
(1) Is sup s∈F N 0 α (s, v) finite or not? Example 2 presents a fuzzy game for which sup s∈F N 0 α (s, v) is infinite. One can easily check that the games in Examples 2, 3, 4 are supermodular, but not convex (the (CwC) property is not satisfied). For convex fuzzy games all three questions mentioned above are answered affirmatively in Theorem 6. By using this theorem, the following additional problems can also be conquered: how to define the reduced games in the steps of the adjusted algorithm, and whether this algorithm has only a finite number of steps.
The following Lemma 5 plays a key role in obtaining our main results on egalitarianism in convex fuzzy games. In its proof we will use the notion of degree of fuzziness of a coalition. For each s ∈ F N this degree is defined by ϕ (s) = |{i ∈ N | s i ∈ (0, 1)}|. Note that ϕ (s) = 0 implies that s corresponds to a crisp coalition, and that in a coalition with ϕ (s) = n no participation level equals 0 or 1. Note further that for s ∈ F N 0 with ϕ (s) = 0
Proof. Take s ∈ F N 0 with ϕ (s) > 0, and i ∈ N such that s i ∈ (0, 1).
and supp(t 0 ) ⊂ supp(t 1 ) = supp(s).
If t 0 = 0, then t 1 = e i and then α (e i , v) ≥ α (s i e i , v) = α (s, v) follows from (CwC). We then take t = e i .
If t 0 6 = 0 and α (t 0 , v) > α (s, v), then we take t = t 0 . Now we treat the case t 0 6 = 0 and α (t 0 , v) ≤ α (s, v). From the last inequality and from the fact that v(s) dsc is a convex combination of
From the (CwC) property of hN, vi it follows then
Now from (1) and (2) we have
Then by applying (3) we obtain
So, we can take t = t 1 .
From Lemma 5 it follows that for each s ∈ F N 0 , there is a sequence s 0 
In view of this result it is easy to adjust the Dutta-Ray algorithm to a convex fuzzy game hN, vi. In Step 1 one puts N 1 := N, v 1 := v and considers arg sup s∈F N 0 α (s, v 1 ). According to Theorem 6, there is a unique maximal element in arg sup s∈F N 0 α (s, v), which corresponds to a crisp coalition, say
In case S 1 6 = N, then in Step 2 one considers the convex fuzzy game
Once again, by using Theorem 6, one can take the largest element e S 2 in according to Dutta and Ray (1989) . Since E (N, v) = E (N, cr (v)) and C (N, cr (v)) = C (N, v), our assertion (iii) follows.
5 The equal division core for convex fuzzy games Given a cooperative fuzzy game hN, vi, we define the equal division core EDC(N, v) as the set (
. 
So
. N, cr(v) ). We prove that for each s ∈ F N 0 there is an
Take T as in (4) . Since x ∈ EDC (N, cr(v)), there is an i ∈ T s.t. 
It is easy to see that E (N, u e T ) Lorenz dominates every other allocation in C (N, u e T ). Moreover, the equal division core EDC (N, u e T ) is the set It is clear that C (N, u e T ) ⊂ EDC (N, u e T ) = EDC (N, cr (u e T )). Here equal division stability means that the solution assigns to any convex fuzzy game an element of the equal division core.
Final remarks
In this paper we introduce the equal division core for fuzzy games and the Also other systems of axioms for the egalitarian solution than the one indicated at the end of Section 5 could be developed (cf. Klijn et al. (2000) ).
